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REASONABLENESS MEETS REQUIREMENTS: 
REGULATING SECURITY 
AND PRIVACY IN SOFTWARE 
PAUL N. OTTO† 
ABSTRACT 
  Software security and privacy issues regularly grab headlines amid 
fears of identity theft, data breaches, and threats to security. 
Policymakers have responded with a variety of approaches to combat 
such risk. Suggested measures include promulgation of strict rules, 
enactment of open-ended standards, and, at times, abstention in favor 
of allowing market forces to intervene. This Note lays out the basis for 
understanding how both policymakers and engineers should proceed 
in an increasingly software-dependent society. After explaining what 
distinguishes software-based systems from other objects of regulation, 
this Note argues that policymakers should pursue standards-based 
approaches to regulating software security and privacy. Although 
engineers may be more comfortable dealing with strict rules, this Note 
explains why both policymakers and engineers benefit from pursuing 
standards over rules. The nature of software development prevents 
engineers from ever guaranteeing security and privacy, but with an 
effective regulatory standards framework complemented by engineers’ 
technical expertise, heightened security, and privacy protections can 
benefit society. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 20, 2008, Anne Pressly, a television anchorwoman in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, was discovered in her home after having been 
attacked and severely beaten.1 Although she spent the next week at a 
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hospital, Ms. Pressly never regained consciousness and ultimately 
passed away on October 25.2 The attack quickly gained national 
media attention,3 especially because the beating was particularly 
savage and yet apparently random.4 
In addition to attracting national media attention, the situation 
surrounding Ms. Pressly’s attack and subsequent hospitalization also 
inspired curiosity among hospital employees within the St. Vincent 
Health System. Within a month of Ms. Pressly’s death, the hospital 
announced the firing of several employees for “improperly accessing 
[her] medical records.”5 
In cases the media follows, there have been many breaches of 
patients’ privacy rights through unauthorized access to medical 
records.6 The suspension or termination of hospital employees often 
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 1. Arkansas TV Anchor Dies Days After Attack, CNN.COM, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www. 
cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/25/tv.anchor.attack/. 
 2. Jacob Quinn Sanders, Hospital Fires Up to 6 for Accessing Pressly’s Files, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (NW. ARK. ED.), Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://www.nwanews.com/ 
adg/News/244079/print/. 
 3. E.g., Arkansas TV Anchor Dies Days After Attack, supra note 1. 
 4. See Steve Barnes, Robbery Suspected as Motive in Beating Death of Anchor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at A17 (indicating that robbery appeared to be the motive for the attack 
and that “the police had no reason to think Ms. Pressly had been singled out before the evening 
her assailant entered her . . . home”). 
 5. Sanders, supra note 2. The hospital indicated that between two and six employees 
accessed Ms. Pressly’s medical records without valid reasons. Id. The hospital detected the illicit 
access to Ms. Pressly’s records because the medical records “were being audited every 
day . . . and as soon as [the hospital] learned of a possible breach, [it] investigated.” Id. The 
employees’ actions likely constituted violations of federal health privacy law. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Jack Brill, Note, Giving HIPAA Enforcement Room to Grow: Why There 
Should Not (Yet) Be a Private Cause of Action, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2105, 2105 (2008) 
(describing the suspension of twenty-seven hospital employees in 2007 for snooping on the 
medical records of George Clooney and his girlfriend); Charles Ornstein, Hospital to Punish 
Snooping on Spears, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2008/mar/15/local/me-britney15 (detailing how the “UCLA Medical Center [was] taking steps to 
fire at least 13 employees and has suspended at least six others for snooping in the confidential 
medical records of pop star Britney Spears” in 2008, even though the medical center had 
circulated a memo upon Spears’s hospitalization reminding employees of patients’ privacy rights 
and indicating that unauthorized access would lead to disciplinary action); Sanders, supra note 2 
(noting how a hospital fired employees in 2006 for unauthorized access to the records of Dick 
Cheney’s hunting friend after he was accidentally shot by Dick Cheney). 
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follows such breaches, owing to the strict privacy protections put in 
place by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)7 and its resulting regulations regarding the security 
and privacy of medical records.8 As a news article describing the 
Pressly situation mentions, however, “you still have to 
wonder . . . why is there not more limited access to those [medical] 
records—especially with a prominent individual when you could 
really expect an unauthorized person would get overly curious? Why 
does the hospital allow any employee access to records they do not 
need to see?”9 
The problem of unauthorized access to private information is not 
limited to the healthcare domain, nor is the general problem 
restricted to unauthorized access. Personally identifiable 
information10—whether financial, medical, or otherwise private—is 
threatened by identity theft,11 data breaches,12 and fraud,13 among 
 
 7. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 8. See infra notes 79–95 and accompanying text. 
 9. Sanders, supra note 2. The quote is from an expert in health privacy law. Id. Note that 
this concern reflects a lack of proper access control mechanisms, which are discussed further in 
Part II.B.2. 
 10. Personally identifiable information (PII) is “information traceable to the individual and 
that person’s behavior.” RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 16.75 
(1985); see also NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.networkadvertising.org/networks/2008%20NAI%20Principles_final%20for%20Web
site.pdf (“PII includes name, address, telephone number, email address, financial account 
number, government-issued identifier, and any other data used or intended to be used to 
identify, contact or precisely locate a person.”). Sector-specific laws and regulations often define 
PII for their sector. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o) (2009) (defining “personally identifiable 
financial information”); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2008) (defining “individually identifiable health 
information”). 
 11. See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY 
REPORT 4 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006. 
pdf (“[Survey results] suggest[] that approximately 8.3 million U.S. adults discovered that they 
were victims of some form of ID theft in 2005.”). 
 12. See Paul N. Otto, Annie I. Antón & David L. Baumer, The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How 
Data Brokers Should Handle the Privacy of Personal Information, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, 
Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 15 (discussing the increase in data breach disclosures starting with data 
broker ChoicePoint’s breach, which became public in February 2005); Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http://privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches. 
htm (last visited May 12, 2009) (documenting 1220 breaches resulting in over 261,759,380 
“records containing sensitive personal information involved in security breaches in the U.S. 
since January 2005”—the actual count is likely higher because many breaches involve an 
unknown number of exposed records). 
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other threats. Misuse of personally identifiable information has 
increased as more information enters electronic form, thus facilitating 
both its exchange and exposure on a larger scale. The transition to 
electronic record systems has necessitated the development of 
complex software systems14 to manage the creation, storage, and 
transmission of electronic information. 
Increasingly, laws and regulations specify how software systems 
must implement data security and privacy measures. Some legal 
requirements regarding security and privacy emerge in advance of 
software system development to control the direction of software 
use.15 Other security and privacy requirements emerge in response to 
perceived excesses or threats from existing software systems.16 In both 
scenarios, policymakers17 must make decisions about the means 
through which they seek to control software design, development, 
and deployment.18 In particular, policymakers must decide which 
approach—rules, standards, or nonintervention—is most appropriate 
to protect security and privacy within software.19 
Once laws and regulations take effect, the policymakers’ task 
may appear complete, as auditors and regulators take over the job of 
overseeing compliance with and enforcement of these security and 
privacy requirements. The software engineering community,20 
 
 13. One major area of fraud involves unauthorized credit card transactions. See Edward A. 
Morse & Vasant Raval, PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards in Context, 
24 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 540, 543–44 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1303122 (discussing the problem of unauthorized charges and how the costs are 
distributed within the industry). 
 14. For the purposes of this Note, a software system is any system in which software plays a 
primary role (for example, an electronic medical records system for managing patient records 
both within and across hospitals). By contrast, a non-software-centric system primarily would 
utilize nonsoftware means to accomplish its purposes (for example, a paper-based medical 
records system). This definition reflects the fact that software permeates almost every aspect of 
modern-day life and attempts to distinguish as unique regulatory subjects systems in which 
software is the primary actor. 
 15. HIPAA is one example. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 16. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), is one such example. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 17. Throughout this Note, the term “policymakers” is used to refer equally to 
decisionmakers in Congress or administrative agencies who are considering whether to regulate 
software. 
 18. See infra Part II. The differences between the design, development, and deployment 
stages of software are discussed in Part I. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. Software engineering is defined as “[t]he application of a systematic, disciplined, 
quantifiable approach to the development, operation, and maintenance of software; that is, the 
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however, has struggled to manage the implementation of these legal 
requirements within the software development process.21 The 
software engineering community has recognized compliance 
monitoring as a significant problem,22 but researchers still struggle to 
develop methodologies for even establishing, much less monitoring, 
compliance.23 Extracting security and privacy requirements directly 
from legal texts has proven too difficult and error-prone to address 
the need for compliance.24 Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in 
legal texts raises numerous problems for engineers seeking to 
implement legal requirements directly into software systems.25 
The disconnect between legal requirements and engineering 
realities raises serious concerns about the efficacy of emerging data 
security and privacy protections. Both engineers and policymakers 
recognize compliance as essential to protecting security and privacy,26 
 
application of engineering to software.” IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, IEEE STANDARD GLOSSARY 
OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING TERMINOLOGY, IEEE STANDARD 610.12, at 67 (1990). The 
software engineering community thus reflects the body of practitioners and researchers in that 
field. 
 21. For an explanation of what the software development process entails, see infra note 35. 
 22. Compliance monitoring is a general problem facing software engineers that extends 
beyond the context of requirements originating in laws and regulations. See, e.g., William N. 
Robinson, Implementing Rule-Based Monitors Within a Framework for Continuous 
Requirements Monitoring, 38 HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 188a, 188a (2005) (“Monitoring 
information systems for requirements compliance is an important and growing problem.”). 
Several new academic and practitioner conferences and workshops have emerged with a focus 
on compliance with legal requirements. E.g., Workshop, Requirements Engineering and Law, 16 
IEEE INT’L REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING CONF. (2008). 
 23. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 188a (“[R]esearch has found that systems are often 
misaligned with their policies, there are no systematic design methodologies for requirements 
monitoring systems, and there is limited support for real-time requirements monitoring.”). 
 24. See Ambrosio Toval, Alfonso Olmos & Mario Piattini, Legal Requirements Reuse: A 
Critical Success Factor for Requirements Quality and Personal Data Protection, 10 IEEE JOINT 
INT’L CONF. ON REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING 95, 96 (2002) (discussing the lack of efforts to 
extract requirements directly from legal texts); Paul N. Otto & Annie I. Antón, Addressing 
Legal Requirements in Requirements Engineering, 15 IEEE INT’L REQUIREMENTS 
ENGINEERING CONF. 5, 11 (2007) (discussing the failures of Toval et al.’s approach to extracting 
requirements directly from legal texts). 
 25. See Otto & Antón, supra note 24, at 7 (cataloging efforts within the software 
engineering community to categorize ambiguities). 
 26. For a discussion of the importance placed on compliance by the engineering 
community, see supra note 22. Regulators have also stressed compliance through the imposition 
of mandatory audits as part of remedies for privacy and security breaches. See, e.g., Providence 
Health & Services, Complaint Nos. 06-47465 & 06-52268 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. July 
15, 2008) (resolution agreement), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/ 
agreement.pdf (mandating a “corrective action plan,” which includes a yearly review of all 
security policies by the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), quarterly onsite audits 
by HHS, and yearly compliance reports submitted to HHS); In re The TJX Cos., Inc., No. 072-
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yet the technical means to establish and maintain compliance are 
lagging behind the legal mandates.27 The result is a situation in which 
Ms. Pressly and her family ostensibly have the protection of the law 
safeguarding Ms. Pressly’s medical records, yet the software systems 
managing her records are ill-equipped to provide the protection 
without the possibility of unauthorized access. 
This Note seeks to explore the relationship between law and 
software with regard to security and privacy. Specifically, this Note 
argues that legal requirements governing security and privacy must 
take the form of broad standards rather than specific rules.28 
Although software engineers may prefer the ease of implementing 
rules—with their specific technological mandates—to ambiguous and 
open-ended standards, security and privacy interests are best 
protected through standards that leave room for evolution. Broad 
standards allow the law to capture moving targets; by requiring 
reasonable software security, for example, the law can continue to 
mandate strong security measures as industry best practices evolve 
 
3055 (Fed. Trade Comm’n July 29, 2008) (decision and order), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080801tjxdo.pdf (including requirements for TJX to 
implement a “comprehensive information security program” and to undergo biennial third-
party audits for the next twenty years); United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (stipulated final judgment), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/ 
choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf (imposing the same requirements on ChoicePoint as those listed 
above for TJX). 
 27. Implementation difficulties have caused the healthcare industry to lag behind in 
meeting certain compliance requirements. For specific details, see Travis D. Breaux & Annie I. 
Antón, Towards Regulatory Compliance: Extracting Rights and Obligations to Align 
Requirements with Regulations, 14 IEEE INT’L REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING CONF. 49, 49 
(2006). 
 28. Cf. Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 
1277–78 (2002) (arguing that courts should favor standards over rules in evaluating cases 
involving cyberspace). This Note adopts the general terminology for differentiating rules from 
standards: “the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to 
give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act.” Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (emphasis omitted). A 
rule is an ex ante statement of the law, id. at 559, such as a requirement to use a specific 
encryption algorithm in a software system. With a standard, by contrast, the law’s meaning is 
determined ex post, id., as would occur with a legal requirement to use reasonable encryption in 
a software system. See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and 
Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 480 (2008) (“Rules and standards may both generate 
uncertainty. Standards are legal norms whose interpretation is provided only ex post by the 
courts. Standards, therefore, produce future uncertainty resulting from the indeterminacy of the 
interpretation given to them ex post by the courts. Rules are concrete norms that leave no (or 
little) discretion to decision makers.”). For a broader discussion of the rules-versus-standards 
debate, see generally Kaplow, supra. For further examples from security and privacy laws and 
regulations, see infra Part II. 
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and improve. Similarly, by including broad privacy protections, the 
law can capture new threats to privacy as understandings evolve 
regarding what constitutes personal information or whether 
previously innocuous information is in fact personally identifiable.29 
Part I of this Note discusses the various aspects of software that 
make it unique as compared with other regulatory subjects. Part II 
discusses the spectrum of choices that policymakers face in regulating 
software. Part III presents the principal argument of this Note: with 
regard to security and privacy protections, standards are more 
appropriate than rules for requirements regarding software systems 
that are made at the original policymaking level. This Note concludes 
with some thoughts on how policymakers’ use of standards in the first 
instance is most effective when engineers create rules to meet the 
standards given to them. 
I.  THE NATURE OF SOFTWARE 
There are several characteristics of software systems that make 
them unique subjects of regulation. These characteristics center 
 
 29. There are several examples of how information can go from seemingly innocuous to 
personally identifiable. One example is census data. See Philippe Golle, Revisiting the 
Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population, 5 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN 
THE ELECTRONIC SOC’Y 77, 77 (2006) (“A famous study of the 1990 census data showed that 
87% . . . of the population in the United States reported characteristics [in the 1990 census] that 
likely made them unique based only on gender, 5-digit ZIP code and full date of birth. The 
study further reported that 53% of the U.S. population is uniquely identified only by {gender, 
place, date of birth}, where ‘place’ is basically the city, town, or municipality in which the person 
resides. Even at the county level, {gender, county, date of birth} uniquely identifies 18% of the 
U.S. population.” (citation omitted)). See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 09-12, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450006 (discussing the 
impact of “reidentification science”—the ability to reidentify previously anonymized data—on 
privacy protections). Another area in which there has been a change in perception of what 
constitutes proper privacy protections involves the movement to make public records available 
online. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2002) (“From the beginning of the twentieth 
century, we have witnessed a vast proliferation in the number of government records kept about 
individuals as well as a significant increase in public access to these records. These trends 
together have created a problematic state of affairs—a system where the government extracts 
personal information from the populace and places it in the public domain, where it is hoarded 
by private sector corporations that assemble dossiers on almost every American citizen.”); 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/onlinepubrecs.htm (last visited May 12, 2009) (“One of the most 
challenging public policy issues of our time is the balancing act between access to public records 
and personal privacy - the difficulty of accommodating both personal privacy interests and the 
public interest of transparent government.”). 
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around the nature of software design, development, and deployment 
as compared with non-software-centric systems. To illustrate these 
unique characteristics, this Part will compare and contrast software 
with physical buildings at three key stages: design, development, and 
deployment.30 Understanding these characteristics is essential to 
making an informed decision regarding what form of regulation is 
appropriate for safeguarding security and privacy in software systems. 
A.  Design 
The crucial differentiating factor of software-based systems is 
that software is virtually unlimited in flexibility and scope.31 Unlike 
the construction of a building, in which the laws of physics constrain 
the possibilities lying before the architect, software can be molded 
into any shape necessary to perform a desired set of functions.32 From 
the perspective of the software engineering community, this flexibility 
has been described in lofty terms: “The programmer, like the poet, 
works only slightly removed from pure thought-stuff. He builds his 
castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the imagination.”33 
Software’s malleable nature allows it to encompass far greater 
complexity than physical counterparts can manage.34 This same 
flexibility, however, comes at a great cost: the overall software 
development process35 is prone to scheduling delays and constant flux, 
 
 30. The similarities and differences noted in this Part are by no means an exhaustive list; 
this Note highlights only those similarities and differences that may influence the decision of 
which legal regime is appropriate in regulating software in a given instance, as discussed in Part 
III. For an explanation of the software development process, see infra note 35. 
 31. This characteristic also has been referred to as software being “plastic.” James 
Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1723 (2005). 
 32. The practicing programmer may take issue with this characterization of software’s 
flexibility, noting the numerous constraints placed on software design by choice of programming 
language, operating system, and so on. Although these are limits on flexibility, they are more 
properly characterized as limitations that emerge during development—unless the initial 
requirements specify those constraints directly. It is therefore important to separate the initial 
design phases, in which decisions regarding scope and direction of the project are made, from 
the development phase, discussed infra Part I.B. This view considers software as the product of 
a software engineering process, which is more appropriate for the types of systems typically 
contemplated by laws and regulations. 
 33. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 7 (Anniversary ed. 1995). 
 34. See Grimmelmann, supra note 31, at 1731–32, 1734 (“Software can successfully apply 
rules whose complexity would make them collapse under their own weight if humans were 
forced to apply them.”). 
 35. This is a term of art in the software engineering community, in which the word 
“development” encompasses more than simply the development phase as the word is used in 
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as stakeholders36 treat flexibility as a license to change requirements 
at any time.37 
B.  Development 
The need to define system functionality38 is the greatest 
limitation on the scope of software (that is, the tasks that the software 
system will perform and the features it will contain). Once decisions 
on the software’s scope and function are made, the “creativity of the 
programmer, the complexity or sophistication of the software itself, 
or the environment in which it operates” serve to limit the software’s 
theoretical flexibility.39 Thus, the narrow selection of permitted inputs 
 
Part I.B. The classic formulation of the software development process includes the following 
key stages: requirements, design, implementation, testing, and deployment. IEEE COMPUTER 
SOC’Y, supra note 20, at 67. Depending on the model in use, the development process may 
involve a linear progression through each stage or a highly iterative process by which software is 
designed, developed, and deployed. Id. The software lifecycle, by contrast, is defined as all of 
the phases in the development process as well as the subsequent operation and maintenance of 
the deployed system. Id. at 68. 
 36. In software engineering, the term “stakeholders” refers to the “individuals or 
organisations who stand to gain or lose from the success or failure of a system . . . . includ[ing] 
customers or clients (who pay for the system), developers (who design, construct, and maintain 
the system), and users (who interact with the system to get their work done).” Bashar Nuseibeh 
& Steve Easterbrook, Requirements Engineering: A Roadmap, 22 INT’L CONF. ON SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING: FUTURE OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING TRACK 35, 37 (2000). An alternative 
definition of the term “stakeholders” refers to any entity with a stake in the outcome of a given 
software system. See Travis D. Breaux & Annie I. Antón, Analyzing Regulatory Rules for 
Privacy and Security Requirements, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 5, 8 
(2008) (including all entities mentioned in a source document as stakeholders). 
 37. See, e.g., Annie I. Antón & Colin Potts, Functional Paleontology: System Evolution As 
the User Sees It, 29 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 151, 151 (2003) 
(“Requirements volatility (customer-desired, short-term functional change) has been identified 
as a principal obstacle to software development.”); Nuseibeh & Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 
39 (“[I]t is usually the case that requirements change during development and evolve after a 
system has been in operation for some time.”). 
 38. Within the software engineering community, the task of defining system functionality is 
known as requirements engineering or “the process of discovering [software’s intended] 
purpose, by identifying stakeholders and their needs, and documenting these in a form that is 
amenable to analysis, communication, and subsequent implementation.” Nuseibeh & 
Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 35. Requirements engineering plays an instrumental role in the 
earliest phases of software development. See JOHN BERGEY ET AL., RESULTS OF SEI 
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND REPORT ON EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 21–22 (2004), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/ 
documents/04.reports/pdf/04tr018.pdf (“It is well recognized in the industry that requirements 
engineering is critical to the success of any major development project . . . .” (citations 
omitted)); IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, supra note 20, at 62–63 (defining the requirements phase of 
software development and its associated tasks). 
 39. R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 479 (2005). 
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and outputs40 for a specific program necessarily limits the virtually 
infinite reach of software that exists in theory. 
Despite the emergence of significant limits on flexibility and 
creativity imposed during the development phase, these limits are 
even more constraining in the development of a physical building. 
First, there are physical limits to the size and scope of a given 
building; in software, however, it is relatively easy to add new 
functionality or address evolving requirements even during 
development.41 Second, constructing a physical building proceeds in 
clearly defined stages, and generally architects and builders try to 
avoid having to undo any portions that have been situated. In 
software, however, there is comparatively lower cost in changing 
many elements of the software, no matter how much has been built.42 
C.  Deployment 
After development or construction has concluded, the first major 
contrast between software systems and physical buildings concerns 
the ease of replication. Once developed, a software system can be 
deployed in a virtually unlimited number of locations with minimal 
additional effort; replication of physical structures can be 
accomplished through reuse of the original design, but development 
must begin anew at each new building site. 
 
 40. Software engineers often define the scope of software in terms of the inputs that the 
system permits and the outputs that the system creates. The process of defining the inputs and 
outputs most often occurs after the requirements specification is complete. 
 41. See, e.g., Barry W. Boehm & Phillip N. Papaccio, Understanding and Controlling 
Software Costs, 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 1462, 1466 (1988) 
(“[T]he cost of fixing or reworking software is much smaller (by factors of 50 to 200) in the 
earlier phases of the software life cycle than in the later phases.” (citations omitted)). Such 
changes are not always cheap, however, as discussed infra note 42. 
 42. This is not to say that the cost of making such changes during development is low. 
Empirical studies of software engineering, for example, have demonstrated that the cost of 
correcting an error increases substantially at each phase of the software lifecycle. See, e.g., 
BERGEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 21–22 (“As compared with defects found during requirements 
evaluations, defects cost 10–200 times as much to correct once fielded [and] 10 times as much to 
correct during testing. . . . A recent study by IBM’s System Sciences Institute found that the 
relative cost of fixing software defects after deployment is almost 15 times greater than 
detecting and eliminating them in development.”); Mark Curphey & Rudolph Araujo, Web 
Application Security Assessment Tools, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2006, at 35, 35 
(“In 1996, Capers Jones showed that, if the unit cost of finding a bug during development were 
US$1, failing to find the same bug until deployment would cost $16,000 . . . .”). The key 
difference is that there are physical, temporal, and pecuniary limitations in the construction of a 
physical building, whereas in software the temporal and pecuniary limitations would be the only 
controlling factors. 
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Further, once its deployment is complete, software is 
“automated” in its function: no further intervention is required for 
software to make its determinations of allowable and prohibited 
behaviors.43 This behavior may not at first glance seem so different 
from a physical building: once conceived, constructed, and completed, 
a building is available for full use. The key difference in this regard 
between software systems and other regulated entities, such as a 
building, is the degree of interaction that software possesses. Software 
may take actions without any human oversight.44 This automated 
nature can be a great strength: software can just as easily handle one 
case as it can handle one billion cases,45 meaning that software 
systems can manage a larger number of transactions than any human-
driven system could hope to address. A significant difference exists in 
scale of usage as well: whereas most physical buildings have a 
relatively low occupancy limit, software may simultaneously 
accommodate many orders of magnitude more users. 
Along with its automated nature, software also produces 
immediate results. Software therefore can bar prohibited behavior 
without ever allowing a violation to occur in the first place;46 similarly, 
software can permit actions to take place immediately, again without 
requiring human oversight. In contrast, a physical building can take 
no action to control its usage: once built, the building’s structure may 
have implications for the building’s usage, but not enforcement of the 
developer’s intent. Legal requirements implemented in software 
provide an immediate interpretation of the requirements as they are 
 
 43. Grimmelmannn, supra note 31, at 1723. Professor Wagner refers to this characteristic 
as software being “preprogrammed.” Wagner, supra note 39, at 478. 
 44. The default behavior of software is that “[t]he programmed algorithm is followed 
without deviation.” Wagner, supra note 39, at 478. It is possible for systems to design oversight 
into the process, as for example by requiring a supervisor to approve an action before the 
software will proceed. As Professor Wagner notes, however, “software-implemented regulations 
are freestanding mechanisms and do not generally require recourse to other institutional players 
for . . . rule determinations.” Id. at 479 (footnote omitted). Human intervention most often is 
included when software systems are required to provide audit capabilities or supplement 
existing, non-software-based processes. 
 45. See Grimmelmann, supra note 31, at 1729 (“Once a piece of software has been written, 
the marginal cost of running it to handle another case can be vanishingly small.”). 
 46. Id. at 1723 (“Rather than relying on sanctions imposed after the fact to enforce its 
rules, [software] simply prevents the forbidden behavior from occurring.”). Note that some 
forms of software, such as distributed software, may impose legal restraints retroactively. Cf. 
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 63, 102–06 
(2008) (discussing how tethered devices, through the use of distributed software, can limit 
“generativity” by controlling what actions are permitted and prohibited). 
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represented in the software system—even if the result was not fully 
understood or even contemplated by the original software 
developers.47 
The immediate results provided by software systems directly 
contrast with another characteristic of these systems: the lack of 
transparency in software’s decisionmaking process. Although an 
individual interacting with a software system will see immediate 
results from an attempt to engage in a particular action, software does 
not provide any explanation of its decisions unless an explanation has 
been included ex ante within the software. Furthermore, unless the 
software is updated, software is locked into providing the results 
programmed in during software development.48 This differs sharply 
from interactions with a physical building, in which many (if not all) 
design decisions are exposed directly to the building’s occupants.49 
The final significant difference between software and its physical 
counterparts is that software is commonly deployed despite the 
existence of known problems in the software. There is an 
understanding in the software engineering community that large 
software systems cannot be constructed perfectly (that is, without a 
single bug or vulnerability).50 This tolerance for bugs and system 
failures contrasts sharply with expectations for physical buildings, in 
which compliance with building plans and specifications is generally 
fairly precise and accurate. This difference in expectations leads to a 
great variance in maintenance costs after deployment: both buildings 
 
 47. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1254 
(2008) (“Although programmers building automated systems may not intend to engage in 
rulemaking, they in fact do so. Programmers routinely change the substance of rules when 
translating them from human language to computer code.” (footnote omitted)); Grimmelmann, 
supra note 31, at 1730 (“Software cannot—as law can—adapt its response in light of later-
available information or a later determination that such information is relevant.”). Note, 
however, that software systems can be updated to reflect new legal understandings, just as 
software developers patch systems to resolve other types of errors. 
 48. See supra note 47. 
 49. Note that such transparency in physical buildings does not mean that the intent behind 
such decisions is evident, simply that the decisions themselves are viewable. 
 50. The software engineering community has standardized precise language to distinguish 
different types of problems. There are three deviations from normal operation of a software 
system: a failure occurs when the system behavior detectably deviates from expected or correct 
behavior; an error is the deviation in system behavior that led to the failure; and a fault is the 
underlying cause of the error. Algirdas Avižienis et al., Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of 
Dependable and Secure Computing, 1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE 
COMPUTING 11, 13 (2004). Bugs and vulnerabilities simply describe different types of unknown 
faults. Id. at 17. 
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and software have an expected maintenance phase after deployment, 
but for software, the cost of testing and maintaining the final product 
may exceed the costs of design and development.51 
II.  THE INTERSECTION OF SOFTWARE AND REGULATION 
With the increased use of computing technologies in modern 
society, there has been a corresponding—though lagging—increase in 
laws and regulations targeting actions that software systems can and 
cannot perform. Although these laws and regulations target various 
types and aspects of software systems,52 this Note will focus on laws 
and regulations concerning data security and privacy protections. 
The idea of regulating software through laws has been called a 
form of legal preemption.53 The spectrum of choices facing 
policymakers who regulate the behavior of software systems includes 
specifying software functionality directly through the promulgation of 
specific rules, defining broad standards with which software must 
comply, and enabling software to take the place of explicit 
regulation.54 In addition, policymakers may choose to not regulate 
software systems at all, leaving security and privacy protections to be 
handled by market forces.55 Each of these options is discussed in turn. 
 
 51. See, e.g., Barry Boehm & Victor R. Basili, Software Defect Reduction Top 10 List, 34 
IEEE COMPUTER 135, 137 (2001) (noting that “low-dependability software costs about 50 
percent per instruction more to maintain than to develop, whereas high-dependability software 
costs about 15 percent less to maintain than to develop”). 
 52. Professors Kesan and Shah provide a list of several areas in which government shapes 
software design, development, and deployment. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping 
Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 322–23 (2005) (“In addition to [spam and cell phone number 
portability], the government is also involved in shaping the development of code for reasons 
involving antitrust, national security, protection of intellectual property rights, accessibility, 
safety, and content labeling.” (footnotes omitted)). Other areas in which the government 
recently has sought to regulate software include electronic voting machines and critical 
infrastructure. 
 53. Wagner, supra note 39, at 485. 
 54. The various approaches to regulating software, however, “are neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive.” Id. at 487. 
 55. The Clinton Administration famously adopted such a market-based approach. See, e.g., 
Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of 
Personal Information, in NAT’L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, ch. 1.A (1997), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy_rpt.htm (advocating industry self-regulation to 
fill the gaps between “pure market” and “pure [government] enforcement” approaches). This 
approach drew significant criticism. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-
Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000) 
(“Far from its promise of Pareto optimality, the proffered combination of self-regulation and 
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A.  Preemption through Legal Rules 
In the strongest form of legal preemption, laws or regulations 
“directly establish[] formal boundaries or requirements for software 
code.”56 Such a rules-based approach by policymakers would include 
instances in which laws or regulations specify that a particular 
software feature is prohibited or another software feature is required. 
This direct legal preemption has been increasingly common in recent 
laws and regulations. 
The clearest example of a rules-based approach governing 
software systems is the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).57 The 
statute imposes a direct requirement on system development: “[n]o 
person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any digital audio 
recording device or digital audio interface device that does not 
conform to—(1) the Serial Copy Management System.”58 The Serial 
Copy Management System thus serves as a specific functional 
requirement for software system design and development.59 
Two state laws mandating data encryption, both scheduled to 
take effect in January 2010, reflect a growing trend among states to 
regulate security and privacy in an effort to slow the flood of data 
breaches occurring nationwide.60 Nevada enacted a new statute in 
2009 requiring all businesses in Nevada to not “[t]ransfer any 
personal information through an electronic, nonvoice transmission 
other than a facsimile to a person outside of the secure system of the 
data collector unless the data collector uses encryption to ensure the 
 
market forces would likely fail adequately to protect data privacy. Industry self-regulation, a 
group’s regulation of its members’ practices with the goal of reducing harmful externalities to 
outsiders, is notoriously inadequate to its task. As trenchant critics have shown, such self-
regulation can only work under conditions of stringent government oversight.”). 
 56. Wagner, supra note 39, at 485. Professor Wagner refers to this method of regulating 
software as “direct” legal preemption. Id. at 487. 
 57. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 (2006)). 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The statute goes on to provide two alternatives to implementing 
the Serial Copy Management System: implementing a system with the “same functional 
characteristics,” id. § 1002(a)(2), or a system that has been “certified by the Secretary of 
Commerce” as accomplishing the same objectives, id. § 1002(a)(3). 
 59. For a brief description of the Serial Copy Management System, see Aaron L. Melville, 
Note, The Future of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: Has It Survived the Millennium 
Bug?, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 380–81 (2001). For a more detailed discussion, see Nika 
Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the Music Industry, 2007 
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001 (2007), http://bciptf.org/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=30. 
 60. For a discussion of the data breach problem, see supra note 12. 
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security of electronic transmission.”61 Nevada law defines encryption 
broadly, rather than specify a particular form of encryption.62 
Massachusetts enacted a more comprehensive set of regulations 
targeting information security. The new regulations require 
“encryption of all transmitted records and files containing personal 
information that will travel across public networks, and encryption of 
all data containing personal information to be transmitted wirelessly,” 
as well as “[e]ncryption of all personal information stored on laptops 
or other portable devices.”63 In addition, the regulation outlines 
several software security requirements for all systems involving 
personal information.64 Like Nevada’s law, the Massachusetts 
regulations define encryption broadly rather than mandate use of a 
particular algorithm.65 
Another form of rules-based regulation of software involves 
policymakers setting rules for the transactions in which software is 
involved.66 This would include situations in which the law requires 
software to be used in a particular way to facilitate transactions, thus 
using software as a means to satisfy some other transactional legal 
requirement. An early effort to prescribe specific rules for software 
development involved the encryption used for communications. The 
federal government proposed a rule known as the Escrowed 
Encryption Standard,67 which focused on providing an encrypted 
telecommunications in a manner that still allowed law enforcement 
 
 61. NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A (2009) (effective 2010); see also S.B. 227, 75th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 3 (Nev. 2009), 2009 Nev. Stat. 1603, 1604 (noting the new statute “becomes effective on 
January 1, 2010”). 
 62. Id. (referencing compliance with generally accepted encryption standards). 
 63. 17 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04 (2008); see also id. 17.05 (“Every person who owns, 
licenses, stores or maintains personal information about a resident of the Commonwealth shall 
be in full compliance with 201 CMR 17.00 on or before  January 1, 2010.”). 
 64. Id. In addition to encryption, the regulations detail requirements related to “user 
authentication protocols,” “access control measures,” firewalls, and malware and antivirus 
software. Id. 
 65. See id. 17.02 (defining “[e]ncrypted” as “the transformation of data through the use of 
an algorithmic process, or an alternative method at least as secure, into a form in which meaning 
cannot be assigned without the use of a confidential process or key, unless further defined by 
regulation by the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation”). 
 66. See Wagner, supra note 39, at 486 (“[Another] form of legal preemption would be legal 
rules that specify the use of particular software in a transactional rather than regulatory 
manner.”). 
 67. Despite the word “Standard” appearing in its name, this proposal qualifies as a type of 
rule when applying the nomenclature used in this Note. The federal government’s use of “rule” 
and “standard” in naming various proposals often does not track this Note’s terminology. These 
variances are noted in footnotes as each law or regulation is introduced throughout this Note. 
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access when authorized.68 This rule imposed detailed requirements on 
the technical implementation of encryption.69 The Department of 
Homeland Security regulations implementing the REAL ID Act,70 
which require compliance with a particular ISO Standard,71 offer 
another example of transactional rules. 
B.  Preemption through Legal Standards 
The second major form of legal preemption is when “legal 
regulations establish the framework within which software will 
operate.”72 This would include laws or regulations governing a general 
area in which software systems ultimately will be responsible for 
satisfying particular requirements. Regulatory standardization is 
weaker than rules-based legal preemption in terms of its impact on 
how software is designed, developed, and deployed: rules provide 
clear requirements and constraints, whereas standards may provide 
only limited or generalized guidance for software engineering.73 A 
glimpse at a few instances of modern, standards-based approaches 
highlights the great amount of flexibility that standards allow 
software engineers. This Section details two recent laws—with 
accompanying regulations—that provide examples of the standards-
based approach to protecting data security and privacy in software 
systems.74 
 
 68. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. COMMERCE DEP’T TECH. ADMIN., 
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUB. 185, ESCROWED ENCRYPTION 
STANDARD (1994), available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip185.htm. 
 69. See id. (specifying the required functions and parameters for the encryption algorithm). 
For a broader discussion of the implications underlying the Escrowed Encryption Standard, see 
generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and 
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995). For a discussion of how the Escrowed 
Encryption Standard fits in with the idea of software-as-regulator, see Lee Tien, Architectural 
Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18–20 (2004). 
 70. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.). 
 71. 6 C.F.R. § 37.19 (2009) (“For the machine readable portion of the REAL ID driver’s 
license or identification card, States must use the ISO/IEC 15438:2006(E) Information 
Technology—Automatic identification and data capture techniques—PDF417 symbology 
specification.”). 
 72. Wagner, supra note 39, at 485. Professor Wagner refers to this as “regulatory 
standardization.” Id. 
 73. For a more in-depth discussion of this crucial difference, see infra notes 156–162 and 
accompanying text. 
 74. There are several examples of other recent laws and regulations that adopt a standards-
based approach to regulating security and privacy in software. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2006) (“A business that owns or licenses personal information about 
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1. HIPAA.  With the passage of HIPAA,75 Congress set in 
motion the development of specific security and privacy guidelines 
for the healthcare domain through standards-based regulation. 
Congress passed HIPAA with the expectation that patient health 
records would transition from paper-based systems to electronic 
health record systems.76 HIPAA required the creation of regulations 
governing privacy77 and security78 for electronic health records. The 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responded with 
the enactment of the Privacy Rule79 and Security Standards,80 
respectively.81 
The Privacy Rule begins by laying out a key guiding principle: 
the standard restricts uses or disclosures of “protected health 
information”82 to what is expressly and explicitly authorized by the 
Privacy Rule.83 The Privacy Rule also recognizes certain health care 
activities as generally permitted uses and disclosures of protected 
health information: “treatment, payment, or health care operations.”84 
 
a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices 
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”). This Note focuses on the 
two laws—with their accompanying regulations—due to the breadth and depth of their coverage 
of security and privacy issues in software systems. 
 75. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 76. In fact, several HIPAA regulatory sections were written for specific aspects of the 
transition to electronic health records. See, e.g., Health Insurance Reform: Modifications to 
Electronic Data Transaction Standards and Code Sets, 68 Fed. Reg. 8381 (Feb. 20, 2003) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
 77. HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note). 
 78. HIPAA § 1173, 110 Stat. at 2024–26 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2). 
 79. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,181 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). For an excellent account of the 
passage of the Privacy Rule, as well as criticisms of its approach to privacy protection, see 
generally Meredith Kapushion, Note, Hungry, Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go 
Too Far, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2004). 
 80. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8333 (Feb. 20, 2003) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162 & 164). 
 81. Despite the names, both the Privacy Rule and Security Standards operate as standards 
under this Note’s nomenclature. See supra note 67. 
 82. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2008) (defining “protected health information” generally as 
“individually identifiable health information,” with limited exclusions for information contained 
in certain types of education and employment records). 
 83. See id. § 164.502(a) (“A covered entity may not use or disclose protected health 
information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this 
subchapter.”). 
 84. Id. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii). The extent of the use or disclosure of protected health 
information is limited by section 164.506(c). 
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The Privacy Rule goes on to require authorizations for many other 
types of uses or disclosures.85 When protected health information is 
anonymized, the restrictions on use or disclosure of such information 
are lessened.86 A significant requirement within the Privacy Rule is 
that regulated health organizations must restrict access to protected 
health information to the “minimum necessary” use or disclosure in a 
given situation.87 The Privacy Rule then specifies requirements for 
informing individuals of their privacy rights.88 
The Privacy Rule includes a general requirement that covered 
entities have “appropriate administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information.”89 
These measures “must reasonably safeguard protected health 
information from any intentional or unintentional use or disclosure 
that is in violation of the standards, implementation specifications or 
other requirements of [the Privacy Rule],”90 as well as “limit 
incidental uses or disclosures made pursuant to an otherwise 
permitted or required use or disclosure.”91 
The other standards enacted in response to HIPAA are the 
Security Standards, which explicitly focus on security for “electronic 
 
 85. The Privacy Rule lays out the requirement for authorization before the use or 
disclosure of psychotherapy notes, id. § 164.508(a)(2), and for uses or disclosures related to 
marketing, id. § 164.508(a)(3); authorization may be waived for use or disclosure with respect to 
research studies if an oversight board approves the waiver, id. § 164.512(i). 
 86. See id. § 164.514(a)–(b) (defining what constitutes de-identification). 
 87. See id. § 164.514(d)(1)–(5) (elaborating the “minimum necessary requirements” for 
uses, disclosures, requests for information, and other requirements). 
 88. Covered entities generally are required to provide individuals with notice of their 
organizations’ privacy practices with respect to the “uses and disclosures of protected health 
information.” Id. § 164.520(a). The Privacy Rule goes on to provide detailed requirements for 
the content of such privacy notices, id. § 164.520(b), as well as the method of delivery, 
id. § 164.520(c). Individuals have the right to access most of their protected health information. 
See id. § 164.524(a) (setting forth the “right of access” as well as defining when covered entities 
may deny individuals the right). Individuals also have a matching right to amend their protected 
health information under section 164.526(a)(1), again subject to limitations, id. § 164.526(a)(2). 
Significantly, individuals also have a general “right to receive an accounting of disclosures of 
protected health information made by a covered entity.” Id. § 164.528(a)(1). The standards for 
the “content of the accounting” are laid out in section 164.528(b). 
 89. Id. § 164.530(c)(1) (emphasis added). Each of the three types of safeguards is defined 
within the Security Standards portion of the HIPAA regulations, id. § 164.304; technical 
safeguards are defined as “the technology and the policy and procedures for its use that protect 
electronic protected health information and control access to it,” id. 
 90. Id. § 164.530(c)(2)(i) (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. § 164.530(c)(2)(ii). 
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protected health information.”92 The Security Standards begin by 
laying out four general security requirements for covered entities: 
(1) Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all 
electronic protected health information the covered entity creates, 
receives, maintains, or transmits. 
(2) Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to 
the security or integrity of such information. 
(3) Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of 
such information that are not permitted or required . . . . 
(4) Ensure compliance with this subpart by its workforce.93 
Notably, a covered entity is free to “use any security measures 
that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately 
implement” the general rules.94 The Security Standards dedicate an 
entire section to detailing standards for technical safeguards.95 
2. GLB Act.  Congress laid out a set of standards for software in 
the financial sector with its passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLB Act).96 Congress passed the GLB Act to meet the modern 
needs of financial institutions by enabling increased competition and 
the combination of diverse financial services within a single 
institution.97 
 
 92. Id. § 164.302. 
 93. Id. § 164.306(a) (emphases added). 
 94. Id. § 164.306(b)(1) (emphases added). The Security Standards go on to list four factors 
that a covered entity must weigh in determining which security measures to employ. 
Id. § 164.306(b)(2). 
 95. Id. § 164.312. Each standard may be accompanied by some implementation 
specifications, which are marked as either required or addressable. Id. § 164.306(d)(1). The 
addressable label indicates that covered entities must weigh the appropriateness of the 
implementation specification, id. § 164.306(d)(3)(i), and either implement the requirement, 
id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(A), or both “[d]ocument why it would not be reasonable and appropriate 
to implement the implementation specification,” id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1), and consider 
implementation of a reasonable alternative, id. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2). The technical 
safeguards include the following requirements: access control—restricting access to only 
authorized individuals, id. § 164.312(a)(1); audit controls—maintaining records of all activity 
within the system, id. § 164.312(b); integrity—guarding against “improper alteration or 
destruction” of data, id. § 164.312(c); authentication—verifying the identity of those seeking 
access to data, id. § 164.312(d); and transmission security—protecting information in transit over 
a network, id. § 164.312(e). 
 96. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 97. See id. pmbl., 113 Stat. at 1338 (noting the purpose of the GLB Act is “[t]o enhance 
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the 
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The GLB Act contains numerous provisions regarding the 
security and privacy of “nonpublic personal information.”98 The Act 
specifies that “each financial institution has an affirmative and 
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to 
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic 
personal information.”99 The Act tasks regulators such as the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) with creating “appropriate 
standards . . . (1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information; (2) to protect against any anticipated threats 
or hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and (3) to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or 
information.”100 
The FTC partly satisfied its requirements under the GLB Act by 
enacting the Safeguards Rule.101 The Safeguards Rule begins by 
broadly requiring that “[all regulated financial institutions] shall 
develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information 
security program.”102 Specifically regarding software systems, 
regulated financial institutions must “assess the sufficiency of any 
safeguards in place to control these risks. . . . [as relevant to] 
[i]nformation systems, including network and software design, as well 
as information processing, storage, transmission and disposal.”103 
Financial institutions must react to this risk assessment by 
“design[ing] and implement[ing] information safeguards to control 
the risks” and additionally must “test or otherwise monitor the 
effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and 
procedures.”104 In addition, financial institutions are required to 
“[e]valuate and adjust [their] information security program in light of 
the results of the testing and monitoring.”105 
 
affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers, 
and for other purposes”). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006). 
 99. Id. § 6801(a). 
 100. Id. § 6801(b). 
 101. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314). This is another instance of a mismatch in nomenclature, here 
created by nongovernmental actors referring to this standard as a “Rule.” See supra note 67. 
 102. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2009). 
 103. Id. § 314.4(b). 
 104. Id. § 314.4(c). 
 105. Id. § 314.4(e). 
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To finish satisfying its requirements under the GLB Act, the 
FTC enacted the Privacy Rule.106 The GLB Privacy Rule (as 
distinguished from the HIPAA Privacy Rule discussed in Part II.B.1) 
largely focuses on issues relating to privacy notices and opt-out 
procedures.107 The GLB Privacy Rule, however, still contains some 
potential restrictions on software, although they are presented 
indirectly. For example, the standards restrict the situations in which 
regulated financial institutions may disclose “nonpublic personal 
information about a consumer.”108 These restrictions may be 
implemented and managed by software systems, which can check 
whether exceptions have been satisfied before sharing personal 
information with a third party. The standards also contain restrictions 
on “redisclosure and reuse of information,”109 which may require 
software systems to maintain records regarding the disclosure status 
of customer data. 
C.  Software-as-Regulator 
The third form of legal preemption occurs when a policymaker 
chooses to support “software-as-regulator.”110 This form focuses on 
structuring the law to favor regulation by software, in lieu of 
specifying legal requirements directly. The fundamental idea is that 
policymakers allow self-regulation at first, then react to how the 
market and industry evolve by protecting the innovations that 
develop. In other words, policymakers validate ex post the role that 
software plays in controlling actions, rather than legislating or 
regulating ex ante. 
Although policymakers have not employed the software-as-
regulator approach in protecting data security and privacy, they have 
regulated software systems more generally using this approach. One 
example is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,111 which broadly 
prohibits using software to circumvent digital rights management 
 
 106. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646 (May 24, 2000) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 313). Under this Note’s nomenclature, this “Rule” is actually a 
standard. See supra note 67. 
 107. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.4–.9 (2009). 
 108. Id. § 313.10(a)(1). 
 109. Id. § 313.11. 
 110. Wagner, supra note 39, at 486. 
 111. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified 
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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(DRM) systems.112 By enacting this restriction, policymakers 
entrusted DRM software systems with enforcing the rights of 
copyright holders. Another example, the E-Sign Act,113 took a slightly 
different approach to the software-as-regulator idea by requiring a 
technology-neutral stance with respect to the treatment of electronic 
signatures in commerce.114 
With the explosion of software in cyberspace, legal scholars 
began to note how software was filling a legal function in advance of 
actual laws and regulations. This idea was best summarized in 
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s pronouncement that “[c]ode is law.”115 
The theory is that software can fulfill a regulatory function—or at 
least have the same effects as regulation—through the choices made 
in its implementation.116 The essential characteristic of software-as-
regulator is that “[a] rule is defined, not through a statute, but 
through the code that governs [a software system].”117 
The “code is law” theory has been criticized as a disingenuous 
representation of the role of software in regulation.118 It is important 
to understand the differences in the way that software regulates, as 
 
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 113. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 
Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–31 (2006)). 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (barring states from “accord[ing] greater legal 
status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical 
specification for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving, 
communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures”). 
 115. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 5 (2006). 
 116. See id. (“Cyberspace demands a new understanding of how regulation works. It 
compels us to look beyond the traditional lawyer’s scope—beyond laws, or even norms. It 
requires a broader account of ‘regulation,’ and most importantly, the recognition of a newly 
salient regulator. . . . In real space, we recognize how laws regulate—through constitutions, 
statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we must understand how a different ‘code’ 
regulates—how the software and hardware . . . that make cyberspace what it is also regulate 
cyberspace as it is.”). Although Professor Lessig’s book focuses on cyberspace, id., the 
arguments extend equally to software systems more broadly. 
 117. Id. at 24. 
 118. For one critical analysis of the idea that code is law, see Wagner, supra note 39, at 460–
61. Another critique focuses on how the “code is law” idea breaks down when “the shifting 
patterns of legal compliance in the 2000s” are considered. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 679, 681–82 (characterizing code as “an anti-regulatory mechanism” that 
influences laws, rather than replacing them). Note that such criticisms have emerged despite 
Professor Lessig’s disclaimer that there are important differences between software and law 
with respect to regulatory effects. See LESSIG, supra note 115, at 5 (“I don’t deny these 
differences. I only assert that we learn something useful from ignoring them for a bit.”). 
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compared to traditional regulation by law.119 Of particular importance 
to this Note, the “code is law” theory has been attacked for its 
misrepresentation of important privacy considerations.120 
The “code is law” concept raises interesting questions regarding 
the role of software as an alternative to regulation. Scholars have 
attempted to explain when policymakers may favor regulation by 
software over regulation by law, weighing the impact of each form of 
regulation as well as each approach’s costs and benefits.121 
D.  Nonregulation 
Policymakers may choose to not regulate software using any of 
the preceding three options. In the absence of laws or regulations, 
there are two possibilities for how the software development process 
still may be subject to guidelines. The first possibility occurs when 
industry standards emerge regarding elements of software design, 
development, and deployment;122 the second approach leaves it to the 
market to set minimum standards. 
A recent example of industry attempting to self-regulate 
software systems is the payment card industry’s effort to develop the 
 
 119. See Wagner, supra note 39, at 460–61 (exploring “the basic truth of the regulatory 
effects of both software and legal code, yet rejecting their equivalence”). 
 120. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶¶ 37–38, 68–69 (2001) (noting how Professor 
Lessig’s analysis misrepresented privacy law and failed to account for various emerging 
statutory privacy protections). 
 121. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 52, at 321 (“Policymakers, however, have had to rely on 
their own insights and experiences when developing code-based solutions, as no comprehensive 
analysis is available to help guide the government in regulating, shaping, and reshaping the 
architecture of information technology.”); id. at 326–27 (detailing five ways in which 
policymakers can influence software development: prohibition, setting standards, market-based 
regulation, modifying liability, and disclosure). 
 122. For a discussion of how industry standards emerge, see generally Mark A. Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 496–97 
(1998). In many markets, there is a “natural tendency toward de facto standardization, which 
means everyone using the same system.” Id. at 496 (quoting Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 
Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 105 (1994)). 
  Some state laws include explicit reference to industry standards as part of their security 
and privacy requirements. See, e.g., 17 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03 (2008) (requiring a company’s 
“comprehensive information security program [to] be reasonably consistent with industry 
standards”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A (effective 2010) (“If a data collector doing business in this 
State accepts a payment card in connection with a sale of goods or services, the data collector 
shall comply with the current version of the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security 
Standard, as adopted by the PCI Security Standards Council or its successor organization, with 
respect to those transactions . . . .”). 
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Data Security Standard (DSS).123 DSS seeks to enhance the security of 
credit card transactions by establishing general standards for securing 
the software systems managing such transactions.124 It includes a set of 
twelve high-level requirements,125 each with detailed lower-level 
requirements and matching testing procedures for participating 
entities to evaluate their compliance with each element of the 
Standard.126 
DSS includes a mixture of specific rules and broad standards for 
the payment card industry to consider. Some requirements provide 
very high-level guidance; for example, Requirement 3.1 instructs 
entities to minimize data storage and develop appropriate data 
retention policies.127 Other requirements are worded in standards-like 
language, but provide guidance bordering on specific rules. For 
example, Requirement 4.1 instructs entities to employ strong security 
protocols, but gives two examples of such protocols and provides 
specific testing procedures for use of one of these protocols.128 Finally, 
some requirements are intended to dictate specific rules for how 
entities manage transactions; for example, Requirement 1 provides 
strict rules on how network security must be handled.129 As a whole, 
DSS seeks to provide a comprehensive framework to protect data 
security in payment card transactions.130 
 
 123. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY 
STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES VERSION 1.2 (2008), 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/download.html?id=pci_dss_v1-2.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 3. 
 125. Id. 
 126. The in-depth elaboration of the high-level requirements into detailed requirements and 
testing procedures begins on page thirteen of the document. This elaboration might be 
construed as a set of rules under this Note’s nomenclature, despite the use of the word 
“Standard” in naming this document, as discussed infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 67. 
 127. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 123, at 20. 
 128. Id. at 26. 
 129. See id. at 15–16 (providing strict rules for restricting Internet access, such as requiring 
entities to “[i]mplement stateful inspection . . . . [and] IP masquerading”). 
 130. For a more thorough analysis of the Data Security Standard and its likely impact within 
the payment card industry, see Morse & Raval, supra note 13, at 550–53. Recent criticism has 
called the Data Security Standard a failure, see, e.g., Andrew Conry-Murray, PCI and 
Schrodinger’s Cat, INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.informationweek.com/ 
blog/main/archives/2009/02/pci_and_schrodi.html (noting that compliance monitoring occurs 
only once a year, because more frequent monitoring “would be obscenely expensive,” and 
arguing that “the only value of PCI is to the card brands, which can use it as a shield against 
federal regulation”), which elicited a reply from a PCI member, see Adrian Phillips, Feedback: 
In Defense of the PCI Data Security Standard, INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 14, 2009, 
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The second nonregulatory option occurs when the industry does 
not set standards, but instead the market informally sets the minimum 
requirements for the software development process.131 For example, 
consumers may demand that a certain level of security and privacy 
protections be included in the software they purchase or services with 
which they interact.132 In the absence of clear regulatory guidance 
regarding software design, development, and deployment, the 
resulting constraints on the software development process will be 
whatever the market will bear.  The government may even choose to 
use its weight in the market as a large buyer of goods and services in 
order to reach the desired level of security and privacy protection.133 
One example of this market reaction concerns general privacy 
protections in the business environment. The United States lacks any 
comprehensive data privacy law, but instead has adopted targeted 
laws in specific sectors.134 As a result, companies have been slow to 
 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=215802153 
(“[T]he PCI DSS has proven to be a highly effective foundation of minimum security standards 
when properly implemented across all systems handling cardholder data. In fact, no 
compromised entity to date has been found to be in compliance with PCI DSS at the time of the 
breach.”). 
 131. This theory drove the market-based approach employed by the Clinton 
Administration. See supra note 55; see also Netanel, supra note 55, at 475–76 (discussing how 
the Clinton Administration believed “the virtual ‘invisible hand’ will generate a set of data 
protection alternatives, ranging from no protection to significant protection,” from which 
consumers could freely select based on their level of concern); id. at 476 (“If enough consumers 
are sufficiently concerned about data privacy to refuse to visit nonprotective sites, the 
Administration believes, market pressure will push sites to provide protection.” (citing Swire, 
supra note 55)). 
 132. Such market-driven activity can be the product of network effects, which refers to the 
impact on markets “in cases in which ‘the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good 
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.’” Lemley & McGowan, supra 
note 122, at 483 (quoting Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, 
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985)). Consumers may develop expectations 
for certain security and privacy protections given their experiences with other software systems. 
 133. For example, the Obama Administration’s May 2009 report on cybersecurity strategy 
recommended leveraging the government’s purchasing power in order to improve security in 
software. See WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND 
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 34 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf 
(recommending the administration “[d]efine procurement strategies through the General 
Services Administration, building on work by the National Security Agency for the Department 
of Defense, for commercial products and services in order to create market incentives for 
security to be part of hardware and software product designs, new security technologies, and 
secure managed services”). 
 134. The GLB Act, which governs financial privacy, and HIPAA, which governs the privacy 
of healthcare information, are two such laws. See supra Part II.B. 
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adopt privacy protections, as evidenced by the slew of data breaches 
made public since 2005.135 The lack of specific guidance has prompted 
some consideration of an industry standard along the lines of the 
payment card industry’s response to the need for heightened security 
protections in the absence of specific regulatory requirements.136 
III.  IN SUPPORT OF STANDARDS OVER RULES FOR SOFTWARE 
SYSTEMS 
As discussed in Part II, policymakers have a wide range of 
options for ensuring that software systems protect data security and 
privacy. They may choose not to regulate software at all,137 instead 
trusting the market to protect security and privacy adequately. 
Similarly, policymakers may pass laws and regulations that enable 
software systems to fulfill a regulatory function, in line with the “code 
is law” theory.138 But neither of these choices is satisfactory in light of 
how, in the absence of laws and regulations, the market generally has 
failed to protect the security and privacy of personally identifiable 
information.139 The numerous problems in protecting data security 
 
 135. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 12. Many of these instances would not have 
been made public but for the passage of data breach notification laws, starting with California’s 
passage of such a law in 2003. For example, evidence suggests that ChoicePoint made its breach 
public only because of the California law. Otto et al., supra note 12, at 16–17. 
  There is a larger debate as to whether the market’s slow adoption of privacy 
protections simply mirrors consumers’ consistent undervaluing of privacy. Alternatively, privacy 
may be a special type of good requiring particular protection, as once lost it is generally 
impossible to restore; for such an explanation, see generally Alessandro Acquisti & Jens 
Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: 
THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363 (Alexandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2007). 
 136. Multinational corporations that face a patchwork of privacy requirements are 
spearheading this market response. See Miriam Wugmeister, Karin Retzer & Cynthia Rich, 
Global Solution for Cross-Border Data Transfers: Making the Case for Corporate Privacy Rules, 
38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2007) (describing the need for “Corporate Privacy Rules” to 
manage the patchwork of global privacy laws, wherein “businesses would establish their own set 
of rules for the transmission of personal information via the Internet . . . . [which] would 
incorporate internationally accepted principles of fair information practices”). The challenge 
facing Corporate Privacy Rules in the absence of regulatory guidance is how to make these rules 
enforceable. Id. 
 137. See supra Part II.D. 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
 139. See supra Part II.D. One problem is the difficulty in enforcing whatever self-regulation 
or market solution emerges in the absence of legal preemption. See, e.g., Wugmeister et al., 
supra note 136, at 488 (noting that “significant concerns remain about how to make Corporate 
Privacy Rules ‘binding’ when businesses volunteer to adhere to a set of rules”). Another 
problem is that the market consistently ignores privacy concerns as expensive externalities. See 
Bruce Schneier, The “Hidden Cost” of Privacy, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, June 15, 2009, 
OTTO IN FINAL2.DOC 11/2/2009  12:21:55 PM 
2009] REASONABLENESS MEETS REQUIREMENTS 335 
and privacy demonstrate the need for legal requirements governing 
software systems; the question then becomes what approach is best 
suited to providing the necessary protections. 
The numerous laws and regulations targeting data security and 
privacy evidence a strong desire and intent on the part of 
policymakers to regulate software systems. Part II described two 
specific approaches to regulating software systems: direct preemption 
through specific rules140 and broader regulatory standards.141 Of these 
forms of legal preemption for software systems, this Note now 
explains how a focus on standards—achieved through regulatory 
standardization—offers the best approach for policymakers to protect 
data security and privacy. 
A.   Why Standards Make Sense for Policymakers 
There are many reasons why standards are preferable to rules 
when it comes to regulating software systems to protect security and 
privacy. A major advantage of standards over rules relates to the 
institutional competence (or lack thereof) of policymakers (and 
courts) to regulate software.142 As policymakers contemplate 
increasingly detailed and complex technical requirements for 
software systems, they are more likely to exceed their knowledge of 
both software generally and technical feasibility specifically. 
Although policymakers can consult with technical experts in crafting 
specific rules for software systems, policymakers’ competence aligns 
 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/06/the_hidden_cost.html (“The meta-problem is 
simple to describe: those entrusted with our privacy often don't have much incentive to respect 
it. . . . What this all means is that protecting individual privacy remains an externality for many 
companies, and that basic market dynamics won't work to solve the problem.”). During the 
Clinton administration, advocates for a market-based approach acknowledged shortcomings in 
what markets provide as compared to results obtained through government action. See, e.g., 
Swire, supra note 55 (“[T]here are significant reasons to believe that government regulation will 
be stricter in enforcing the protection of personal information than this sort of self-regulation. 
The difficult question will be to balance these gains in privacy protection against the likely 
higher administrative and compliance costs of government regulation.”). For more debate 
regarding the efficacy of market solutions, see supra note 130. 
 140. See supra Part II.A. 
 141. See supra Part II.B. 
 142. Wagner, supra note 39, at 492; see also Lee, supra note 28, at 1307–11 (discussing how 
courts benefit from standards-based approaches due to a narrower focus on the facts of the case 
at hand). 
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much better with a focus on clear expressions of their intent to 
protect security and privacy.143 
It is much easier for policymakers to enact a standard requiring 
reasonable safeguards for medical records and then allow regulated 
entities to determine how best to implement those safeguards144 than 
it is to spell out exactly what safeguards are considered reasonable. 
By leaving technical details for later consideration by technical 
experts and regulated entities, policymakers can rely on auditors and 
regulators to monitor for compliance with broad standards.145 
Another primary concern with rules-based approaches involves 
“the difficulty in directly addressing software in legal regulations.”146 
Attempts to impose strict rules on software may fail to account for 
the inherent imperfection associated with software development.147 
Because software development never seeks to eliminate all errors in a 
system, but rather seeks to reach a tolerable amount of faults,148 strict 
rules may be impractical unless they make concessions for 
imperfection. In a worst-case scenario, a set of strict rules may even 
be impossible to implement in conjunction with functional software 
because of the nature of software and policymakers’ lack of 
institutional competence to make specific decisions ex ante. 
 
 143. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 992 (1995) (noting how 
cyberspace is an area in which many have argued that policymakers “lack enough information 
to produce rules that will yield sufficiently accurate results”). 
 144. This was the approach taken in the HIPAA Security Standards. See supra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
 145. The concern with institutional competence comports with Professor Kaplow’s general 
assessment of the efficiency advantage of standards as cheaper to promulgate than rules. 
Kaplow, supra note 28, at 562. By deferring the difficult task of determining the law’s content, 
policymakers avoid the high costs of attempting to learn enough to effectively create rules. 
 146. Wagner, supra note 39, at 492. 
 147. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 148. See id. There is also substantial research in software engineering on how to prioritize 
faults to fix during software testing, given that all faults cannot be eliminated. See, e.g., John D. 
Musa, Operational Profiles in Software-Reliability Engineering, 10 IEEE SOFTWARE 14, 28–31 
(1993) (explaining how testing can use operational profiles to identify “the failures that occur 
most frequently,” taking into account factors such as criticality and relatedness). This holds even 
for important data security and privacy safeguards. See generally JOHN VIEGA & GARY 
MCGRAW, BUILDING SECURE SOFTWARE: HOW TO AVOID SECURITY PROBLEMS THE RIGHT 
WAY (2002) (describing the security gap in modern software development and listing principles 
to manage security during development). In fact, privacy and security faults are harder to detect 
than other bugs in software systems because they are not evident until the software system has 
been tested, whereas other faults generally manifest as errors or failures during development 
(and therefore are addressed through the development process). 
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The nature of software149 makes rules-based approaches unlikely 
to succeed in protecting security and privacy in the long term, because 
“software development is a rapidly moving, nearly unpredictable 
target.”150 The rapid pace of technological change surrounding 
software system development heavily favors a standards-based 
approach that allows software engineers to operate within the 
framework of standards, instead of being chained to rules that no 
longer mirror reality.151 Any attempt to codify rules regarding 
software systems therefore will be thwarted by the pace of 
technological change and the virtually unlimited flexibility of software 
systems. Given the rapid obsolescence of software and technology,152 
specifying rules for software systems may lead to costly compliance 
efforts that provide minimal long-term benefit (because security and 
privacy are not protected adequately by obsolete technical 
safeguards). If policymakers instead clearly identify their high-level 
goals and provide standards for software systems, compliance efforts 
can evolve with the changes in software and technology. 
The risk of rules quickly becoming outdated highlights another 
significant factor that weighs in favor of standards: the cost incurred 
in specifying rules. Rules-based approaches incur significant costs in 
specification as compared to standards-based approaches to 
regulating software because they must be much more intricately 
designed.153 These specification costs outweigh the potential savings in 
compliance costs. A general concern for any system is “the increased 
cost of error inherent in any legal preemption scheme,”154 but the 
specification cost is much higher for rules than standards.155 The 
increased cost of specifying rules stems from the lack of institutional 
competence with respect to software systems when the rulemaking is 
left to policymakers, as mentioned above. When nonexperts craft 
rules, there is a much higher chance that expensive-to-specify rules 
will have decreased or no actual utility because they do not apply 
effectively to software. A standards-based approach to regulating 
 
 149. See supra Part I. 
 150. Wagner, supra note 39, at 492. 
 151. Sunstein, supra note 143, at 993–94 (“In the face of rapidly changing technology, 
current rules for regulation . . . will become ill-suited to future markets.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., id. at 992 (“Production of rules entails high ex ante investment of political and 
informational costs.”). 
 154. Wagner, supra note 39, at 492. 
 155. See supra note 153. 
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software systems mitigates the specification cost by better matching 
policymakers’ competence and avoiding complex technical 
implementation details. 
Although specification costs are higher for rules, as one would 
expect, compliance costs are likely to be higher for standards.156 This 
is because rules—once specified—provide clearer guidance on the 
precise legal requirements to be addressed by software systems. It is 
much easier for software engineers to translate legal rules into 
software requirements.157 The heightened cost of compliance with 
standards can be offset, however, in two ways. First, the cost generally 
associated with standards-based approaches can be mitigated if 
regulated entities—with the expertise of software engineers on 
hand—define rules to elaborate standards.158 These rules, crafted by 
technical experts rather than policymakers, can evolve alongside 
technological advances without requiring a retooling of the 
underlying legal standards. Second, compliance costs also can be 
mitigated by the creation and evolution of industry best practices with 
respect to legal standards for software systems.159 Best practices can 
both provide a clear benchmark for compliance and evolve with rapid 
technological advances. Although the Data Security Standard for the 
payment card industry emerged in lieu of regulatory guidance,160 it is 
an excellent example of how industry can define more specific rules 
to elaborate legal standards.161 But if policymakers specify rules, the 
evolution of best practices is preempted and replaced with a need to 
focus on specific compliance goals—leading to the problems discussed 
above. 
 
 156. This holds true for rules versus standards more generally. See Kaplow, supra note 28, at 
562–63 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than standards because rules involve advance 
determinations of the law’s content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors to 
predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations of the 
law’s content.”). 
 157. See supra note 38. 
 158. This practice is already common in technical fields. For example, technical 
organizations such as the IEEE, ISO, and ANSI promulgate a variety of standards governing all 
aspects of engineering. 
 159. Proposals for industry standards have highlighted lower compliance costs as a major 
selling point. See, e.g., Wugmeister et al., supra note 136, at 449–50 (noting how a patchwork of 
international privacy laws raises the cost of compliance); id. at 478 (touting lower compliance 
costs as a primary advantage of the proposed Corporate Privacy Rules). 
 160. See supra Part II.D. 
 161. With such implementation rules, situations like the invasion of Pressly’s medical 
privacy, see supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text, may well have been averted. 
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Finally, even though software engineers may prefer rules because 
of the certainty they provide, standards provide sufficient guidance 
for implementing and complying with legal requirements. As noted 
above, standards bodies and other technical groups can still address 
the technical details related to regulatory standardization.162 
Standards, accompanied by clear statements of policymakers’ intent, 
provide sufficient information to lead to the development of industry 
best practices. 
B.  How Software Engineers Can Respond to Standards-Based Legal 
Requirements 
The nature of software systems is mirrored in the software 
development process. The design and development of software is 
rules-driven, with software engineers seeking to capture system 
requirements in precise specification documents.163 It is therefore 
relatively straightforward for software engineers to adapt to new legal 
requirements for software systems when those legal requirements are 
in the form of clear rules. 
Standards-based approaches thus present a significant challenge 
to the current rules-focused model of software development.164 
Software engineers do not generally possess the competence to 
identify and interpret legal texts. As standards require more 
interpretation than rules, software engineers are at a significant early 
disadvantage.165 In addition to requiring more interpretation, several 
other institutional hurdles confront software engineers as they adjust 
to managing legal standards’ interpretation and potential evolution.166 
 
 162. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 38. This description of the software development process follows 
traditional models of development. Some new models, such as agile development, may be 
considered more standards-driven, as they eschew formal processes in favor of rapid 
development strategies. 
 164. Agile development, see supra note 163, would be much more amenable to standards-
based approaches, given the natural inclination to standards over rules in that development 
process. The ensuing discussion instead focuses on more traditional development models. 
 165. This disadvantage presumably is overcome as standards mature and software engineers 
interact more with such standards over time; the initial hurdles to adoption are the focus of this 
discussion. 
 166. See Otto & Antón, supra note 24, at 6–7 (recognizing several hurdles: identification of 
legal requirements; interpretation of legal rules; evolution of law through amendments, 
revisions, and case law; managing ambiguity; and providing traceability for compliance 
monitoring). 
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Although standards will be harder to assimilate into the software 
development process, there are several reasons why software 
engineers should embrace standards rather than rules governing 
software systems. In fact, several of the advantages that policymakers 
gain in choosing standards over rules translate into reasons for 
software engineers similarly to favor standards-based approaches. 
Instead of making software engineers implement technical 
details drafted by policymakers, standards-based approaches 
recognize the institutional competence of software engineers to flesh 
out technical details regarding security and privacy protections in 
software systems. Software engineers have various tools available for 
ensuring data security and privacy; with the guidance of a standards 
framework and clear statements of policymakers’ intent, software 
engineers can select the most appropriate approach for satisfying the 
legal requirements. Software engineers are also better positioned to 
make use of the institutional knowledge of standard-setting 
organizations and technical groups. 
Standards also mirror the general understanding of software 
development as an imperfect process,167 with all software systems 
containing some number of errors. Tolerating imperfection is more 
compatible with a standards-based approach; for example, HIPAA 
Security Standards allow regulated entities to employ whatever 
security measures are reasonable and appropriate, rather than 
dictating the implementation of specific measures.168 If the software 
engineering community at large recognizes imperfection as a 
necessary evil,169 then a security measure can be considered 
reasonable even if it is imperfect, assuming that it is still generally 
accepted by the industry. 
The rapid pace of technological change should also garner 
support among software engineers for standards rather than rules.170 
In one sense, technological evolution will require software engineers 
to update systems regardless of whether the law provides rules or 
standards for software. Standards, however, allow software engineers 
to abandon obsolete security and privacy safeguards as technology 
advances without falling out of compliance with strict rules that 
embody understandings of a bygone era. 
 
 167. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text. 
OTTO IN FINAL2.DOC 11/2/2009  12:21:55 PM 
2009] REASONABLENESS MEETS REQUIREMENTS 341 
As discussed above, standards-based approaches to protecting 
security and privacy in software systems are likely to incur higher 
compliance costs than rules-based approaches.171 The same mitigating 
factors apply here, however, making standards still more beneficial to 
the software engineering process. The technical expertise of software 
engineers (and regulated entities more generally) allows the industry 
as a whole to respond to legal standards by crafting more detailed 
technical rules—or in the alternative, to create industry best practices 
for complying with the legal standards for protecting security and 
privacy in software systems.172 The payment card industry’s efforts 
with the Data Security Standard reflect an effective use of industry 
expertise in meeting a particular need for security and privacy 
protections.173 Technical rules or best practices enable software 
engineers to bypass the difficult problem of understanding legal 
standards, as the software engineers can be confident that these rules 
have been crafted to capture the intent and requirements of the legal 
standards. In addition, the detailed guidance created by technical 
experts is more easily updated to match the rapid pace of 
technological advances. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal protections for data security and privacy in software 
systems remain an emerging area of law. When software engineers 
lack regulatory guidance, the market has proven ineffective in 
providing adequate protection for data security and privacy. Recent 
approaches to providing protection through laws and regulations have 
favored the use of broad standards in lieu of specific rules. Both 
policymakers and engineers benefit from the choice of broad 
standards; through these standards, data security and privacy are 
protected even as technology rapidly evolves and new threats emerge. 
If specific rules are still required, it is preferable for policymakers to 
 
 171. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text. 
 172. This model mimics the general reliance on experts in the agency decisionmaking 
process. See, e.g., Adrian Vermuele, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2232 
(2009) (“In the administrative state, a great deal of agency decisionmaking draws upon the 
aggregate view of a group of experts, especially when there is an expert ‘consensus.’”); see also 
id. at 2234 (arguing that “when agencies are uncertain of facts, causation, or future 
consequences of alternative policies, following the consensus or majority view of experts is a 
perfectly rational decisionmaking strategy”). 
 173. See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text. 
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leave that task to entities with the technical expertise to create and 
maintain such rules. 
Rules, when appropriate, are not detrimental in software 
engineering. Rather, this Note argues that software engineers are the 
appropriate people to make these rules. If a policymaker makes rules 
ex ante, the rules may be inflexible and ill-informed as to the realities 
facing software engineers. When a rule is crafted by software 
engineers or industry experts in response to a standard put forward 
by policymakers, however, it retains flexibility to be changed easily 
and more effectively as the rule becomes obsolete. In fact, the rule 
would have to be altered to stay in line with the controlling standard 
when it is no longer effective. 
In situations like the media attention surrounding Ms. Pressly, 
the combination of policymaker-initiated standards and engineer-
crafted rules is most likely to provide the protection of security and 
privacy that was lacking in her case. Although HIPAA provided the 
necessary standards-based framework, the lack of technical rules to 
implement HIPAA’s reasonableness requirements led to the 
unsatisfactory result of prying eyes trumping personal privacy. As 
policymakers and engineers learn to better create standards-based 
frameworks backed by implementation rules, society can benefit from 
improved security and privacy protections in software systems. 
